Coca or Death? Cocalero Movements in Peru and Bolivia by unknown
T R A N S N A T I O N A L
DEBATE PAPERS
APRIL 2004
no 10
T N I  B r i e f i n g  S e r i e s
No 2004/4
Drugs  and Democracy  P rog ramme
T
N
I
C o c a l e r o  m o v e m e n t s  i n  P e r u
a n d  B o l i v i a   
C o c a  o r  D e a t h ?
TN
I
C O N T E N T S
AUTHORS:
Allison Spedding Pallet
Hugo Cabieses Cubas
EDITORS:
Martin Jelsma
Pien Metaal
Virginia Montañés
TRANSLATION AND
TEXT EDITTING:
Glynis Cooper 
Barbara Fraser
Anabel Torres
DESIGN:
Jan Abrahim Vos
Logo Drugs & Conflict:
Elisabeth Hoogland
PRINTING:
Drukkerij Raddraaier,
Amsterdam
FINANCIAL SUPPORT:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(The Netherlands)
CONTACT:
Transnational Institute
Paulus Potterstraat 20
1071 DA Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel: -31-20-6626608
Fax: -31-20-6757176
drugs@tni.org
www.tni.org/drugs
Contents of this booklet may
be quoted or reproduced,
provided that the source of
information is acknowledged.
TNI would like to receive a
copy of the document in which
this booklet is used or quoted.
You may stay informed of TNI
publications and activities by
suscribing to TNI’s bi-weekly e-
mail newsletter. Send your
request to tni@tni.org or
register at www.tni.org
Amsterdam, April 2004
Europe and Plan Colombia
Debate Paper No. 1,April 2001
Fumigation and Conflict in Colombia. In the Heat of the
Debate - Debate Paper No. 2, September 2001
Afghanistan, Drugs and Terrorism. Merging Wars
Debate Paper No. 3, December 2001
Alternative Development and Eradication.A Failed 
Balance - Debate Paper No. 4, March 2002
Polarisation & Paralysis in UN Drug Control. Breaking the
impasse - Debate Paper No. 5, July 2002
An Agenda for Vienna. Change of Course
Debate Paper No. 6, March 2003
Alternative Development and Conflict in Colombia. Cross
Purposes - Debate Paper No. 7, June 2003
Forward Operating Locations in Latin America.Transcending
Drug Control - Debate Paper No. 8, September 2003
Drugs and Conflict in Burma (Myanmar). Dilemmas for Poli-
cy Responses - Debate Paper No. 9, December 2003
All editions of the series are available online in English
and Spanish at: www.tni.org/reports/drugs/debate.htm
 Editorial
 The Cocalero movement and drug policy in 
Bolivia 4
 Peasant and cocaleros movements in Bolivia;
organisation and structure
 The Cocalero struggle: Instruments and Strategies
 Box: Dialogues and Agreements
 Multidisciplinary effects of coca leaf production
 Recommendations
 Maps 14
 Coca leaves cultivation in Bolivia; legal framework 
 Coca leaves cultivation in Peru
 Peru: the Cocalero struggles and Good 
Governance 16
 Cocaleros
 The Dialogue Group
 Agreements
 Box: Dialogues and Agreements
 The founding of the CONPACCP
 The strikes of February 2003 
 The April 2003 marches
 Meeting with the President and the Supreme Decree 
 Current situation in the coca producing valleys 
 Main complaints of Local Farmers and Authorities 
 Used Abreviations 26
 References and useful websites 27
TN
I
D r u g s  a n d  C o n f l i c t s  n o  1 0  -  A p r i l  2 0 0 4 3
E D I T O R I A L
en years after the first cocalero
march in Bolivia, when coca leaf
producers from the tropical area of
Cochabamba trekked over 600
kilometres to the seat of govern-
ment in La Paz to express their indignation
about the effects of drug control policies in
their region, there is still no cause for cele-
bration.The same holds true for Peru, where
despite a series of peasant protests, govern-
ment leaders are even more reluctant than
their Bolivian counterparts to treat the issue
with the urgency required.
The general public opinion and sometimes
even experts involved in drug control policy
know little about the cocalero movements.
Misconceptions are among the reasons why
it so difficult to solve current conflicts in a
peaceful, sustainable way without imposing
simplistic and violent ‘solutions’ to the com-
plex issue of coca cultivation in these two
countries.
The cocaleros, who usually are displaced for-
mer miners or poor peasant families, are
easy prey for drug control policies. By rob-
bing them of their source of income in
exchange for alternatives that do not yield
the expected results, the unbalanced
approach of international drug control reveals
its counterproductive and devastating eco-
nomic effects, along with the high degree of
repression with which these policies are
implemented.
The claim in the International Narcotics
Board‘s annual report that voluntary eradi-
cation of coca crops is a success, on the con-
trary, it has been a failure.1 Many coca pro-
duction or eradication zones live under con-
stant tension and violence. Eradication is
accompanied by such a show of military or
police force that people are coerced to
accept. Although not marked by the wide-
spread use of chemicals that has charac-
terised Plan Colombia, forced eradication in
Bolivia and Peru has claimed and will claim
more casualities if it continues on its present
course.
A balanced approach that seeks to eliminate
the harm inflicted by the international com-
munity’s determination to “abolish drugs” on
the supply side is a minimal requirement for
justice for those who only produce coca
leaves.
A deeper problem in both countries is the
lack of leeway for governments and societies
to design their own independent policies for
solving the current crisis.This crisis is char-
acterised on the one hand by constant polit-
ical turmoil, aggravated by the structural eco-
nomic difficulties found in rural areas where
people have few productive options, and on
the other hand by international conventions
that force governments to focus on reducing
the supply of coca leaves used to produce
cocaine.
Because the coca leaf has been consumed
since time immemorial and is an integral part
of Andean and Amazon culture, its inclusion
in international drug-control policy along
with its derivate cocaine, further complicate
the situation.
From Bolivia the news of a proposal being
prepared directed to the United Nations to
decriminalise the coca leaf, and also encour-
age study of real consumption patterns
nationally is a positive sign of change. Mean-
while, there is a need for a mature, democ-
ratic culture that allows for consultation and
consensus instead of entrenchment behind
inflexible positions. But there are dominant
voices that hardly allow for these internal
processes and do not respect them: they are
referred to in these two articles as ‘The
Embassy.’
In this issue of Drugs and Conflict, two authors
offer a distinct interpretation of the cocalero
movements in Peru and Bolivia that help dis-
pel the misconceptions.
1 Annual Report INCB 2003, p.54
olivia and Peru are two Andean coun-
tries where the planting, sale and con-
sumption of coca leaves are wide-
spread and legal activities. Both were
main producers of coca leaf for cocaine till the
nineties.The rise of drug trafficking in Bolivia
began in the seventies, reaching its peak
between 1980 and 1986. Coca production
declined considerably after this period.This was
mainly due to the expansion of the Colombian
crop production.There had been some coca
eradication campaigns earlier in Bolivia but
they had little impact. It was only after 1986
that policies to reduce and eliminate coca pro-
duction were implemented.These policies have
been further intensified since the nineties,
despite Bolivia’s reduced participation in inter-
national drug trafficking.
Bolivia’s central and influential peasant organ-
isation comprises the cocaleros (peasants who
grow coca).Their movement has headed the
resistance to state policies to control and
eradicate coca production. It is a legal organi-
zation with no proven connection with subver-
sive or illicit groups.The movement has con-
siderable legitimacy in the public opinion which
prevents the government from openly repress-
ing the movement and that hinders the imple-
mentation of coercive crop eradication meth-
ods, like aerial fumigation. Nevertheless,
Bolivia’s government, in accordance to the
demands of ‘the (U.S.) Embassy’, continues
with its eradication campaign resulting in clash-
es between the cocaleros and the government
that shows no signs of abating in the near
future.
Peasant and cocaleros movements in
Bolivia; organisation and structure
Efforts have been made to create peasant trade
unions in Bolivia since the thirties. The current
peasant union movement dates back to the
National Revolution of 1952, led by the MNR
(Nationalist Revolutionary Movement). In 1953,
this party launched its Agrarian Reform, abol-
ishing the colonato (tenancy of plots in exchange
for free labour) in large haciendas1 and distrib-
uting the land among the peasants. In order to
release the peasants from this form of inden-
tured labour and distribute land among them,
a peasant union in each reformed hacienda was
created. This form of organisation was also
adopted by many native communities (not
indentured to haciendas), replacing their tradi-
tional authorities, which tended to have close
links with local authorities, identified with the
landowning elite.From the point of view of the
nationalist government (1952-1964), peasant
unions helped incorporate peasants into the
country’s political life. However, the party
organised and controlled them, thus blocking
the existence of a truly independent peasant
movement.This worked well at the start and
continued to function as the ‘Military Peasant
Pact’ during the military governments that
defeated the MNR in 1964,until 1974,when the
peasant movement severed all ties with the
government, after the repression against a
peasant demonstration, under the orders of
then dictator General Hugo Banzer, which
resulted in the Massacre of Tolata.At this time,
several independent organisations emerged. In
1979, and a national organisation was estab-
lished, called the United Bolivian Union Con-
federation of Peasant Labourers (Confed-
eración Sindical Única de Trabajadores
Campesinos de Bolivia CSUTCB),with a strong
indigenous or katarista leaning. It was in mem-
ory of Julián Apaza,‘Tupac Katari’, an anti-colo-
nialist rebel executed by the Spaniards in 1782.2
Although the organisation has undergone sev-
eral internal clashes and divisions, it continues
to be the organisational body for the peasant
movement and represent the Bolivian peas-
antry before the government.3
The rural union movement has roots through-
out the country, but their organisation is larg-
er and more active in certain regions, amongst
those the coca-growing regions.Bolivia has two
of these regions: the Yungas of La Paz (North
Yungas, South Yungas and Inquisivi Provinces)
and the Chapare of Cochabamba (Chapare,
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1 Agricultural property operated by a landowner, who is directing a labor force and aspires to a certain status.
2 Rivera, S., Oprimidos pero no vencidos. Luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980, UNRISD, Geneve, 1986.
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Tiraque and Carrasco Provinces). Andean
migrants settled in the Yungas in pre-Hispanic
times and coca leaf production took hold there
in the colonial period.Up to 1953,most of the
region belonged to haciendas4. Then the land
came into the hands of the peasants,organised
into unions during the Agrarian Reform as
already mentioned.The Chapare is a tropical
area colonised in the 20th century. Migration
was massive in the seventies, when coca culti-
vation started to spread throughout the region.
Coca bush became a large-scale crop in the
seventies stimulated by the demand of drug
trafficking5 and overtaking production in the
Yungas. Colonisation was largely spontaneous
and the colonists organised themselves into
peasant unions to facilitate registering owner-
ship of the land they had occupied with the
authorities.6The settlers in both regions joined
the organisational structure, which grouped a
certain number of grassroots peasant unions
into a Peasant sub-Central or Central unions.
This assembled into a Federation, reaching all
or parts of a given province, which in turn
forms part of a Departmental Federation affil-
iated to a national organisation.
The grassroot level of the peasant union is, in
fact, the local government of a rural commu-
nity. In order to join it, one must own land in
a region and carry out certain duties, like pay-
ing fees, taking part in communal chores or
holding a union post. The average member
tends to be the male head of a household and
can be a widowed or single mother.Single peo-
ple or those living in a community but not own-
ing land are not represented in the peasant
union.The Board of Directors,headed by a Sec-
retary General, rotates annually among all
members.Women do not usually hold posts,
except in the symbolic ‘feminine link’. Howev-
er,since the year 2000,some women in the Yun-
gas have become Secretary Generals of their
communities. Even so, they tend to be ‘women
on their own’ (divorced, separated, widowed
or single mothers). The trade union meets
monthly in the Yungas or every two months in
the Chapare. It addresses various issues, rang-
ing from community infrastructure or things
like theft, to external relations with NGOs or
municipalities and in the case of the cocalero
trade unions - how to respond to state coca
policies.
In the Yungas, peasants formed another organ-
isation called ADEPCOCA (Asociación Depar-
tamental de Productores de Coca).7 Formally,
ADEPCOCA is independent, but in practice, it
is part of the peasant federations.For example,
approval by the relevant trade union is needed
to join ADEPCOCA. In each community there
is a representative in charge of ‘communal
orders’, such as the invoices demanded for
each bale of coca entering the Legal Coca Leaf
Market (Mercado Legal de la Hoja de Coca) in
La Paz. A woman usually holds the post, since
trade is traditionally a female task in the Andes.
Peasant unions own warehouses in the villages
of the Chapare, where coca is sold to traders
(mostly women).They also charge a tax on each
transaction, but the peasant organisation has
not extended its control of the market into the
wholesale coca market of Sacaba in Cochabam-
ba.
From these two markets, coca is sent to the
provinces and abroad, especially to Argentina,
which has a thriving coca market for what is
labelled ‘traditional consumption’ such as chew-
ing, plus medicinal and ritual uses8.This trade
depends on professional traders,not peasants,
and is subjected to strict government and fis-
cal control,which purportedly guarantees that
coca will be exclusively used for legal purpos-
es.Evidently, this is not always the case,but the
cocaleros argue that any other use is not their
responsibility. As a recent response to the
strong cocalero organisation, the government
has intensified its control over these traders,
confiscating their licenses and limiting their
number. Peasants have bitter class feelings
T
N
I
T h e  c o c a l e r o  m ov e m e n t  a n d  d r u g  p o l i c y  i n  B o l i v i a
D r u g s  a n d  C o n f l i c t s  n o  1 0  -  A p r i l  2 0 0 4 5
4 Soux, M. L., La coca liberal. Producción y circulación a principios del siglo XX, 1993.
5 Sanabria H., The coca boom and rural social change in Bolivia, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1993.
6 Blanes, J., De los valles al Chapare. Estrategias familiares en un contexto de cambios, Ceres, La Paz, 1983.
7 Spedding, A., “Cocataki, taki-coca: trade, traffic and organised peasant resistance in the Yungas of La Paz”, en Leons, B. y Sanabria,
H. (comps.), Coca, cocaine and the Bolivian reality, State University of New York Press, New York, 1997.
8 Rivera Cusicanqui, S., Las fronteras de la coca. Epistemologías coloniales y circuitos alternativos de la hoja de coca. El caso de la fron-
tera boliviano-argentina Aruwiyiri/IDIS-UMSA, La Paz, 2003.
against intermediaries and do not tend to
defend these merchants, although, in the long
run, the repression launched against the coca
trade is bound to have negative effects on
them also.
As someone rises in the hierarchy of the union
structure, the leadership has more and more
to do with political activism and the making of
a political career.9 Time demands become
greater, as do demands for knowledge of laws,
statutes etc.and skills such as speechmaking in
Spanish and indigenous tongues, command of
reading and writing in Spanish. Posts in these
peasant organisations,also in the provinces,do
not include a salary as money comes in only
from the very limited membership dues.Quite
often leaders pay expenses out of their own
pockets.This self-financing system is crucial to
maintain the spirit of autonomy of the peasant
movement with respect to the state and other
parties.But it limits participation especially for
male heads of households10 and grassroots
peasants who cannot leave work and it also
makes many leaders more prone to accept
secret pay-offs.The grassroots members tend
to suspect that any leader can ‘sell out’.This sus-
picion leads to a monitoring effect that pre-
vents the peasant movement from being infil-
trated or effectively controlled by outside
political forces. But unproven accusations can
also destabilise the leadership. Sometimes, a
patronage-type relation develops with certain
NGOs that provide transport, boarding and
lodging and ‘training’. The need for formal
know-how,which many peasants lack, has cre-
ated an ambiguous type of relationship with
some non-peasant ‘consultants’ – various kinds
of professionals,activists or politicians – whose
presence contradicts the movement’s inde-
pendent character, forcing them to act behind
the scenes. It is not really certain how much
these outside actors have influenced the move-
ment’s stands and actions, or whether the
movement has used them,so that the dominant
class listens to arguments it would reject com-
ing from the mouths of peasants.
Peasant leaders start their careers at local and
provincial levels but, in order to reach nation-
al levels, they must earn the support of other
provinces.Ecological diversity in Bolivia is enor-
mous, and the interests of a quina producer in
Lípez, for example, have little in common with
those of a cocalero from the Yungas,even if they
are both peasants.There is also cultural diver-
sity to contend with. In the Andean region, the
quechuas (Cochabamba, Potosí, Chuquisaca),
tend to clash with the aymaras (La Paz,Oruro),
while in the lowlands dozens of languages
exist, some of them relatively well-organised,
but together all rivalling with the Andeans.Due
to their number and higher degree of organi-
sation, peasants from the Andes have always
dominated the CSUTCB and in consequence,
in the nineties, the peasants of the lowlands
preferred to assert themselves as ‘indigenous
peoples’ and create their own organisations,
such as the Confederation of Indigenous Peo-
ples of Eastern Bolivia (Confederación de Pueb-
los Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano CIDOB).
While in the fifties the first national leaders
were quechuistas from Cochabamba,the kataris-
mo of the eighties was dominated by amayris-
tas from the Northern Altiplano.11 The con-
flicts between Felipe Quispe, ‘el Mallku’ based
among the aymaristas of the Altiplano and Evo
Morales based among the quechuistas of the
Chapare, form only one publicised case among
many others, in which various political factions
clash over regional and sectorial interests, and
over the caudillista tendencies of individual
leaders. However, sectorial interests tend to
prevail and in spite of the many fractures and
threats of division, the CSUTCB has remained
as one organisation. Ethnic and nationalist dis-
course attracts many intellectuals,but for peas-
ants it is little more than rhetoric. Peasants
from the Yungas, for example,are aymaristas and
regard themselves culturally as closer to those
settling the Omasuyos Province who support
el Mallku. In politics, however they prefer to
support the faction led by Evo, because he
defends coca, while in their opinion el Mallku
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9 Ticona, E.; Organización y liderazgo aymara, 1979-1996,Universidad de la Cordillera/Agruco, La Paz, 2002.
10 It is significant that the two most well-known peasant leaders between 1995-2000, Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe, do not take
part in active parenthood: the first has always been single and the latter is currently divorced, although he was married previously
and has had eight children.
11 The grassroots peasantry tends to speak of quechuistas (those who speak Quechua) and aymaristas (those who speak Aymara).
has not taken the coca issue seriously enough.
Both Evo and el Mallku have tried to forge a
political career in Parliament, but Evo’s dis-
course,more class-conscious,wins many more
votes than el Mallku´s ethnic-nationalist dis-
course.
Since the eighties, an attempt has been made
to establish the Confederation of Peasant
Women Bartolina Sisa (Confederación de
Mujeres Campesinas Bartolina Sisa, who was
the partner of Tupac Katari) on a national
scale,parallel to the federations of ‘males’. It has
provincial and departmental headquarters.
Although there is no shortage of peasant
women with political awareness, most of the
issues this organisation addresses are not gen-
der-differentiated. Filling a post here, especial-
ly at the grassroots level, is just confined to tak-
ing on a responsibility; an obligation to serve
the community and not an opportunity to gain
access to a position with power.Women’s fed-
erations usually exist only at the provincial level
and provide space for the personal progress of
some of its leaders with the most political
ambition or capacity.This does not mean that
there is no authentic activism among the lead-
ers,but these organisations are far from achiev-
ing the level of participation that male federa-
tions have. Furthermore, it is even more diffi-
cult for a poor peasant, wife and mother to
leave her farming chores for a few days.This is
further aggravated by machismo and biases
about women’s lack of ability to make speech-
es or enter politics.These attitudes seem to be
gradually changing.Women leaders  tend to be
single or elderly women.Women’s attendance
at meetings at whatever level does not tend to
exceed 20% and the frequency with which they
ask to speak is lower than their physical pres-
ence.This relative institutional invisibility does
not prevent women from actively participating
in the mobilisations.
The Cocalero struggle: Instruments
and Strategies
The general guidelines for Bolivia’s drug poli-
cy are derived from international conventions
and,more directly, from the United States.This
country is reputed to have put into effect the
draconian Law 1008 (1988).This current legal
framework of the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia,
defines ‘traditional zones’ for coca cultivation
(chiefly the Yungas), in which crops are allowed,
while the rest of the country (chiefly the Cha-
pare) is defined as ‘surplus areas in transition’,
in which the crop must be eradicated and
replaced. In Chapare eradication proceeded on
the basis of paid compensation per coca
hectare eradicated, together with the promo-
tion of ‘alternative development’:roads,schools,
palm-heart and banana planting that,compared
to coca, were not economically profitable.
Once their compensation ran out, many peas-
ants planted coca again. In 1998, the govern-
ment of ex-dictator and then ‘democratic’
president, Hugo Banzer, launched the Dignity
Plan (Plan Dignidad), which reduced compen-
sations until he completely did away with it. In
2000 he resorted to the forced eradication of
coca fields,carried out by armed soldiers with-
out consulting or compensating their owners.
Although its economic and social conse-
quences have been disastrous, the two govern-
ments following Banzer have maintained this
policy.Until early 2004, forced eradication was
only implemented in the Chapare after a failed
attempt in the South Yungas colonisation area,
in June 200112.The Embassy continues to insist
that there is ‘surplus’ coca in the Yungas and it
is rumoured that forced eradication will be
undertaken in the region.Together with erad-
ication comes ‘interdiction’ which is meant
allegedly to repress drug trafficking,but implies
multiple abuses against the civil population like
unjustified detentions and other violations of
human rights.
All the policies described above came into
effect without consulting the peasants.The few
negotiation spaces opened up are the result of
successful protests from the peasants but they
are limited to payments for damage inflicted like
compensation for the dead and wounded, or
the granting of some benefits not directly
linked to coca like road-building equipment.
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Dialogues and Agreements in Bolivia
Year Type of dialogue/ origin Agreements - Disagreements Dates and
Duration
1996 March of cocalero women in the Cha-
pare, along with wives of the President
and Vice-President, taken up once
more by COB.                   
First marches produce no agreement. Then COB achieves:
- Release of leaders jailed.
- Forced eradication is not practiced and will not be practiced.
- Care of abuse victims.
- Creation of Permanent “Coca-Cocaine” Commission.
December 11
‘95 to
February 2 ‘96
Follow-up of February 3 Agreement,
facilitated by COB. 
“Understanding agreement” is signed in order to create active verification
commissions that monitor enforcement of Alternative Development (AD),
eradication and commercialization mechanisms. 
May 9  with
June 25  as
deadline
1997 Dialogue with new government
regarding reduction of coca to annual
goal (decertification by U.S.) begins.
Agreement signed to eradicate 3000 coca hectares in exchange for: 
- Compensation (US$2500 per h.) 
- Opening of markets.
- Creation / strengthening of small-scale industry.
- Land and human settlements.
- Withdrawal of Armed Forces from the Chapare.
August 11 to
October 17
1998 Legal commercialisation of coca leaf
with Cbba Precinct.
Pact regulating reopening of primary coca markets. Each member may
transport 50 pounds of coca for own consumption every three months.
January 8
Great tension arises due to eradica-
tion of alleged surplus coca in the
Chapare. 
Pre-agreement: -Destruction of alleged surplus coca is suspended.
-Victims of police abuse are granted compensation.
-Jailed leaders are set free.
April 20
Initiative of civil organisations that
renew dialogue for the purpose of
demilitarizing the Chapare. 
Attempts to bring both parties together fail, because neither one wants to
yield in their entrenched positions, while an atmosphere of violence contin-
ues to take hold in the Chapare.
June 14 to 22
A cocalero march starts out at the
Chapare towards La Paz. Another
march leaves Los Yungas.
Entrenched positions; an agreement is signed without content, except for
stating that there is a pressing need to conciliate and prevent any further
violence. March is regarded as a failure. 
August 7 to
October 8
2000 Five day blockade of Los Yungas- La
Paz road due to eradication plans for
the region.
An 18-point agreement with a solution principle is drawn; it not only refers
to coca but to the problems that the peasantry faces in general.
April 14 to19
Blockade of main highway
Cochabamba-Santa Cruz, Chapare.
They sign an 18-point agreement: control over AD resources; no army quar-
ters to be constructed in the Chapare; construction of markets; pre-invest-
ment on agro-industrial complex.
September 23
to October 13
2001 Harassment of trade unions and their
leaders; proposal regarding coca fami-
ly plot or cato; threats of road block-
ades. 
No agreement can be reached and dialogue is barely established. Lower
Camera issues initiative to try to facilitate it. Parties finally hold talks for two
days but they do not reach an agreement.
November 6 to
27
2002 Clashes in coca market due to decree
prohibiting coca commercialisation
Signed agreement suspends DS in question and road blockade is lifted. Januari 16 to
February 9
Mobilisations and clashes in the Cha-
pare.
An anti-conflicts/ negotiating commission is formed. Studies on AD, demil-
itarization and legal markets.
September 13
Broadening of dialogue themes and
divisions in peasantry.
It is suspended and no further progress takes place. December 13
2003 Road blockade threats. “Coca tables” carry on but there are no clear advances. Cocaleros call
“fourth pause” on February 2. 
Irregular until
February 13
Dialogue Table restarted under new
threats of road blockades.
Act, not undersigned by parties, establishing that members of the dialogue
table will use waiting period to work on technical and administrative
aspects that will form part of the study about the legal coca leaf market and
the new components of an alternative development plan. The Government
defines the subject of the family cato as “one more not very serious propos-
al”.
March 17 to
20. Suspended
until April 20
Government presents new anti-drug
strategy 2004-2008 before U.N. Nar-
cotics Commission.
Government states in Vienna that it will refuse to put eradication on hold or
allow the possibility of growing a family coca plot or cato.
April 12 to 16
New government of Table refers to
possibilities of dialogue.
Three-month truce granted to new government. Oct.-Nov.-Dec.
2004 Commitment to reach new 2004-2008
drug strategy and declaration of state
of emergency regarding cocaleros in
the Chapare.
Revision of Law 1008; study of legal market; alternative development; eradi-
cation put on hold; proposal to de-penalize drugs internationally and
demand of services and management in the Chapare.
Began on Feb-
ruary 16
Source: CEDIB 8
Each government insists that ‘The law [1008]
is not negotiable’ (President Carlos Mesa, Jan-
uary 2004) and refuses to reconsider the gen-
eral drugs policy framework, even when the
peasants (especially in the Yungas) tend to
accept repression against ‘controlled sub-
stances’ and the reduction of legal planting
zones.They are only requesting a better defi-
nition of these areas and guarantees for their
crops. In the Chapare some propose the
restriction of cultivation to a small plot per
family. The government of Banzer y Quiroga
(1997-2002), and that of Sánchez de Lozada
(2002-2003),set up a series of  ‘dialogue tables’
to discuss coca, but its officials only repeated
their pre-defined stands.For example, in 2000,
when the cocaleros protested because palm
hearts never reached the prices promised as
an incentive to plant this product, the govern-
ment replied that the export price had fallen
due to ‘dumping’ by Ecuador in the Argentinean
market,and the peasants could not do anything
about it. On the one hand, the government
exerts political pressure on the peasants to join
alternative development schemes, and on the
other hand, it refuses to apply fiscal or politi-
cal measures like price subsidies or promotion
in export markets in order to make these alter-
native products profitable.The cocaleros never
refuse to participate in negotiations but gov-
ernment intransigence forces them to resort
to pressure tactics.
Road blockades are the main measure used to
exert pressure and, for decades, the main
instrument of the Bolivian peasant struggle.The
country’s main highway crosses the Chapare.
This has allowed its cocaleros to paralyse Bolivia
on many occasions despite the rise of military
repression and militarization of the region. In
the cities, protest marches are a general tool
of struggle. In 1993, a march of peasants from
the Yungas took place; in 1994,a march of peas-
ants from the Chapare joined peasants from
the Yungas and in 1996, a march of cocalero
women from the Chapare, all of them depart-
ing from their own provinces towards the cap-
ital, encountered military repression that
forced them to abandon the highway and cross
the plains using footpaths.They gained a great
deal of public sympathy but the state’s eventu-
al concessions were insignificant.13 By 2001,the
government had assumed a sterner stance and
attempted to suppress another march leaving
from Cochabamba, forcing its participants to go
back. Many returned to the march, but the
impact of the publicity and the raised aware-
ness of public opinion had already been dimin-
ished. Blockading roads was readopted, as the
main instrument while at the same time forced
eradication was already under way in the Cha-
pare.
At least since 1986, the Bolivian government
terms the cocaleros as ‘narcoguerrillas’, argu-
ing that they are linked to subversive organi-
sations, although it has been unable to prove
such links.More convincing are the references
to the ‘Comités de Autodefensa’ (Self-Defence
Committees) in the Chapare.MNR distributed
Mauser rifles and organised peasant militias in
defence of the revolution in the fifties,and many
peasants still own these guns, plus more mod-
ern ones acquired recently. Besides, almost all
peasant males have had to go into the army, a
service labelled ‘compulsory’. But in effect it is
only the peasants and the lower urban class
that undergo this training. Thus they already
have a military training with no need of out-
side training.These factors combined with the
tradition of the peasant uprisings of Tupac
Katari,which are always recalled in the speech-
es of the peasant leadership to legitimise armed
resistance in extreme circumstances. It is not
clear what relation these Committees have
with the formal trade union organisation. It
would appear they are more aimed at restrain-
ing the peasants than promoting or guiding
their actions.The peasants know they cannot
hope to sustain an armed encounter with the
Army and their organisation recognises the
state’s legal framework. Isolated actions do
take place, apparently stemming from certain
radical community leaders, consisting of ‘caz-
abobos’ (homemade booby traps), or snipers
who shoot from the mountains at the soldiers
eradicating cocales or clearing tree trunks and
stones from blocked roads. Until 2000, peas-
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13 Camacho, N., “La marcha como táctica de concertación política. Las marchas cocaleras de 1994 y 1995”, in Laserna, R. (coord.)
Empujando la concertación. Marchas campesinas, opinión pública y coca. PIEB/CERES, La Paz, 1999. / Spedding, A. Batallas rituales y mar-
chas de protesta. Modos de apropiarse del espacio en el departamento de La Paz,Temas sociales 23, La Paz, 2002.
ants were the only casualties (women and chil-
dren included), usually shot down by the mili-
tary at blockades. In 2002, the list of fatal casu-
alties included six soldiers and policemen.
Most of these were young conscripts,peasants
from other parts of the country.
If forced eradication is undertaken in the Yun-
gas, the resistance there is bound to be
stronger there than in the Chapare.The high-
ly mountainous terrain of the Yungas are in
their favour (the Chapare is flat), as well as the
cocaleros from the Yungas are convinced of their
right to grow coca as part of their ancient her-
itage (in the Chapare, most of the population
are migrants with no coca-growing tradition).
Furthermore, the chapareños are ‘softened’ by
over a decade of compensated eradication
and alternative development programmes, so
that eradication was already a regular compo-
nent of their productive context14 and they are
willing to consider alternative crops, if feasible
and profitable. In the Yungas, compensated
eradication was only offered at the end of the
eighties, and to a very limited extent.15 The
peasants there, particularly those in the ‘tradi-
tional zone’, believe that ecological conditions
do not allow for alternatives to coca.The Boli-
vian state is well aware of this and has begun
its ‘alternative development’ efforts in regions
like Caranavi,which did not produce coca until
the end of the nineties, but it is feared that,
were it to undertake forced eradication in the
Yungas, the consequences might be violent.
Since 1979, the political strategies of the peas-
ants have included a ‘political instrument’, a
party organisation that competes on the elec-
toral stage. At times, they have formed their
own parties, like MITKA16 or MRTK17; other
strategies have included ‘borrowing the
acronym’ of an established party like Eje
Pachakuti or Izquierda Unida, under which rural
candidates have run for elections. They have
never had more than one or two representa-
tives on a national scale, and although the can-
didate belonging to MRTKL,18 Víctor Hugo
Cárdenas, got to be Vice-President with
Sánchez de Lozada in 1997,he could not intro-
duce any significant guidelines into govern-
ment policy.Recently the peasants adopted the
acronym MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo).
With the initial support of the cocalero feder-
ations in the Chapare, this party won the vote
of the peasantry and took control of several
towns in the Chapare; it got some representa-
tives elected in 1997 and achieved a massive
vote in the national elections of 2002 (from
peasants and several urban sectors).However,
the control of the municipalities it did win has
not much to do with the issue of coca per se,
but is rather the result of local government
reforms promulgated in 1994 and known as
Popular Participation. These reforms have
allowed peasant candidates to be elected as
Mayors in several rural municipalities. The
cocalero movement as an organisation played no
role either in the 2000 ‘Guerra del Agua’
(Water War) or in the 2003 ‘Guerra del Gas’
(Gas War) which lead to the impeachment and
flight of President Sánchez de Lozada. In fact,
the peasants from the Chapare could not par-
ticipate in the latter at all, since military con-
trol over the region prevented road blockades
from being set up.Peasants from the Yungas did
block the road and march to La Paz,but as par-
ticipants in a general mobilisation against the
government, not with demands around the
coca question. As cocaleros, they gained noth-
ing out of the mobilisation since just three
weeks after being sworn in, the new President
declared:“Bolivia’s policy with respect to this issue
[coca] is a state policy; it will not change in func-
tion of the change in government.Our commitment
to eradicating illegal coca continues and so does
our commitment against illicit trafficking” (Presi-
dent Carlos Mesa, November 2003).
Multidisciplinary effects of coca leaf
production
In Bolivia, the coca leaf is not just an input for
the manufacture of cocaine,but a merchandise
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14 Sanabria, H., The coca boom and rural social change in Bolivia, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1993.
15 Leons, B., “After the boom: income decline, eradication and alternative development in the Yungas”, in Leons, B. y Sanabria, H.
(comps.), Coca, cocaine and the Bolivian reality. State University of New York Press, New York 1997.
16 Indigenous Movement Tupac Katari.
17 Revolutionary Movement Tupac Katari.
18 Revolutionary Movement Tupac Katari for National Liberation.
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item consumed under various guises through-
out the country and regarded as indispensable
in several settings such as marriage rites and
work in the mines. In cocalero regions,peasants
use the money they get from selling coca to buy
food and clothing, pay for transportation, edu-
cate their children, hire lawyers and much
more. The reduction of coca planting in the
Chapare is considered to have had a negative
impact on the GNP of the region and the coun-
try, not just limited to decreasing the strength
of drug trafficking,already in recession in Bolivia
long before forced eradication was even intro-
duced.19The official figures of hectares of coca
plantations eradicated are exaggerated,as they
are estimated on the basis of the full extent of
any plot on which even just a few plants were
found. In the Chapare, militarization has pro-
duced a climate of constant tension that has
disrupted social relations and negatively affect-
ed people’s daily lives on top of the economic
crisis caused by the eradication efforts in the
absence of profitable alternatives. 20
On an international front,Plan Dignity in Bolivia
is presented as a successful model, combining
eradication and repression,together with alter-
native development. But in reality, alternative
development has failed; a truth hidden in
silence. Since 1994, there has been no nation-
al publication analysing the issue. In 2003,some
alleged thieves ‘stole’ the hard disks in the com-
puters of the Ministry in charge, so no infor-
mation exists regarding what was done with
the large sums destined for alternative devel-
opment.Projects were designed from the out-
side by people without the relevant knowledge
and were not tested first.The peasants them-
selves were used as guinea pigs for alternative
products. When the peasants did manage to
grow alternative crops, they found it was diffi-
cult to access the market and that prices were
too low. We already mentioned the case of
palm hearts.Another example is the Milka dairy
plant, set up in spite of the fact that the Cha-
pare had insufficient milk production and no
market strategy for the small quantity it did
process.21 In the Yungas, the Agroyungas Pro-
ject 22 offered a new variety of coffee, but the
seeds imported were infected with broca, a
plague that has even infested native coffee
varieties and contributed to the collapse of the
coffee industry, forcing peasants to resort to
growing coca even more. It is not the cocaleros
who have benefited the most from alternative
development schemes,but the consultants and
technical staff involved in them, both national-
ly and internationally.
In the Yungas, the cocalero economy represents
one of the few flourishing cocalero economies
in the country, backed by ADEPCOCA, which
has allowed the peasants to take over the part
of the market previously in the hands of inter-
mediaries belonging to other social classes.
However,a climate of constant tension prevails,
due to the political threats made by the nation-
al government. Meanwhile, international com-
mentators agree that Bolivia’s state policies
have no repercussions on the availability of
cocaine in the world market.An ‘unsought’ con-
sequence of the cocalero conflicts has been the
launching of trade union candidate from the
Chapare,Evo Morales,on the national scene.23
In 2002,he came in second in the national elec-
tions. But his position as leader of the parlia-
mentary opposition and potential president
elect has led him to ‘decocalise’ his speeches
and adopt stances more in tune with the dom-
inant discourse.For example,not only does he
publicly distance himself from the acts of armed
resistance in the Chapare, as all other trade
union leaders do, but he ceased to demand an
end to the militarisation of the Chapare and
demand stopping forced eradication there, as
a solution to the conflicts.Although it is unde-
19 This is due chiefly to the expansion of coca fields in Colombia. In the eighties, Colombian buyers arrived in Bolivia to acquire basic
paste to process back in Colombia. In the mid nineties, the production of Colombian cocaine made this unnecessary. Furthermore, it
seems that when the famous Medellín ‘cartel’ and the others fell, the new networks replacing them no longer had contacts in Bolivia
or reasons to risk going there.The Bolivian drugs trafficking networks are much more modest and do not have the capacity to export
cocaine to the North, limiting themselves to sending small shipments to neighbouring countries.
20 See Así erradicaron mi cocal, Testimonios de campesinos chapareños en los tiempos de la erradicación forzosa (PIEB/Mama Huaco,
La Paz, 2003) for testimonies from peasants on this score.
21 Rijnhout, L. y Joep, O., “Mala leche”. Una historia amarga de desarrollo en el Chapare, CEDOIN, La Paz, 1994.
22 Leons, B., “After the boom: income decline, eradication and alternative development in the Yungas”, en Leons, B. y Sanabria, H.
(comps.), Coca, cocaine and the Bolivian reality, State University of New York Press, New York, 1997.
23 Albó, X., Pueblos indios en la política, Plural/CIPCA, La Paz, 2002.
niable that if this were to take place, armed
actions would cease immediately. In this sense,
the cocalero movement does not represent a
threat to ‘governance’, since it does not chal-
lenge Bolivia’s political order.
The proposals emerging from the grassroots
level, on behalf of the cocalero movement, are
limited by their regional character,which influ-
ences yungueños to deny their support to cha-
pareños and,within the Yungas itself,divides the
‘traditional zone’ and the ‘colonisation zones’.
Class perspectives lead people to concentrate
exclusively on the question of coca production,
leaving aside its sale, although without this
commerce there would be no economic rea-
son to produce coca. Much less is there any
regard for the impact of prohibition in gener-
al, partly because the consumption of ‘drugs’
hardly takes place among the peasants.Official
condemnation is accepted as something sepa-
rate from the policy affecting the producers. In
the same fashion, it is claimed that ‘they are the
ones who make it [cocaine]’, that is, it is not
the peasants, and the unions reaffirm that they
will expel any member involved in the making
of cocaine paste in the community.
In the Yungas, the legal coca market is viewed
as somewhat limited and soon to be saturat-
ed if broadening production areas is to be
allowed.The definition of legal zones accord-
ing to Law 1008 is based on a study of coca
consumption carried out at the end of the sev-
enties.The impact on coca leaf demand of the
demographic and social changes that have taken
place since then is unknown. Since 2002 there
has been talk of a new study, which is still to
be conducted.The proposals seem to contem-
plate a survey to identify the social groups (per
age, gender, place of residence, occupation,
etc.) consuming coca leaf, its purpose and in
what quantities, thus calculating legal demand.
Designing and implementing a survey of this
kind on a national scale constitutes a great
methodological challenge. Meanwhile, a first
step would be to systematise the data collect-
ed by DIGECO, which registers the quantity
and destination of all coca taken out of the legal
markets located in Villa Fátima and Sacaba.
Apart from providing an idea of the regions it
is consumed in, the choice of the sites in which
to carry out the survey would indicate signifi-
cant gaps between the population at the des-
tinations and the quantity of coca consumed,
if any.At the same time, the first party guilty of
possibly waylaying shipments from inside the
legal market would be the government itself,
via DIGECO, for it does not check the validi-
ty of the destinations registered.This explains,
perhaps, why DIGECO never provides infor-
mation to this effect, and it is strange that nei-
ther the cocaleros nor the intellectuals partic-
ipating in the ongoing debate have ever
demanded that this data be published. Both
data on the current market trends and a sur-
vey on consumption might yield information
uncomfortable to all parties involved.
The cocalero proposals are based on the
straightforward defence of the right to culti-
vate coca, based on economics and varnished
in cultural and indigenous tones like upholding
of Andean traditions of “millenary leaf” culti-
vation. Federations from the Chapare have
proposed taking charge of some alternative
development installations, but this is more a
demagogic proposal than a valid strategy; if the
installation is not profitable per se, peasants
taking it over will not change the situation.The
same applies to proposals to industrialise the
coca leaf, which raise many hopes among its
producers,but never develop into feasible pro-
jects.Economically attractive products, such as
coca tea (mate de coca), must deal with an
already-saturated national market.Coca leaf is
not permitted for export due to internation-
al regulations that classify it as a narcotic sub-
stance comparable to opium,cocaine or hero-
in.The economic arguments for coca produc-
tion are viable, demonstrating that there is no
other crop that can be cultivated in its place;
given the circumstances of the peasant econ-
omy as well as providing the same income from
coca.They fail to address the core of the argu-
ment used to attack coca, which is the refusal
to allow the consumption of cocaine for recre-
ational purposes. As a result, both the govern-
ment and the cocaleros remain firm in their
stands,not giving way to rational debate or per-
mitting the search for empirical data and objec-
tivity on addressing the problem.
It might be argued that the root of the prob-
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lem is not the ‘war against drugs’, but Bolivia’s
position as a client state of the U.S., forced to
accept the mandates of the latter (whether it
be suppressing drug trafficking or implement-
ing Neo-Liberalism).The dominant class seeks
to suppress the peasantry, viewed as a ‘back-
ward’ group that must be marginalized, if not
altogether eliminated, for the good of the
nation.Peasant trade unionism,at its beginning,
was a means to achieve a goal, but later it has
been used by the peasantry as a legitimate
weapon against its oppressors.Now the trend
is to have it lose legitimacy, arguing that peas-
ants are drug dealers and subversive.The con-
sequences of abandoning this pathetic submis-
siveness are impossible to determine, since no
government has ever attempted to do so.
Proof of this is the debate about the extent of
the cocales that already exist or that should be
authorised to exist in order to satisfy local
demand.They are based on figures supplied by
the DEA.The Bolivian government has proved
incapable of financing studies of its own to reaf-
firm or dispute this data.The cocaleros, bogged
down by their distrust of the state, are also
reluctant to systematise the data at their dis-
posal, or try to undertake their own research
on the subject. Intellectuals and national and
international organisations have not been able
to change this situation,sometimes due to their
inadequate knowledge of the practical realities
of coca cultivation (which leads them to make
categorical statements in the absence of real
figures),24 at other times because, like the
peasant movement, they are motivated by ide-
ological ends of their own (feminism, indige-
nous ideology, ecology, etc.).
Recommendations
On the national level
• Demilitarisation of the Chapare, putting an
end to forced eradication and the implemen-
tation of similar policies elsewhere in the
country has to be abolished.
• Alternative development programmes offer-
ing substitute crops might be implemented,
as long as coca eradication is not made com-
pulsory in order to participate in such pro-
grammes. Substitute products should be
previously tested in order to ascertain
whether they are suitable for a given region,
and peasants should have access to prof-
itable markets if they plant them.
• Instead of repressing those who trade in
coca leaf, both the government and the
cocaleros should seek ways of facilitating
coca distribution for legal consumption to
the benefit of peasant producers and other
social groups by a share in this market.
• Publicize the known fact that the more the
legal trade in the product is blocked, the
more the market will tend to deviate to ille-
gal forms.
• Research studies on the marketing and con-
sumption of coca leaf, as well as its real pro-
ductivity per hectare are to be conducted.
Issues should be discussed on the basis of
valid data. Methodology of the studies
should not be biased in order to produce
the results desired by those financing or pro-
moting them.
In the international context
• New ways to promote marketing of such
products as coca tea could be found.
• Ban on production of coca leaf should be
removed from international conventions
dealing with narcotic substances. This
requires a determined effort on the part of
the Bolivian government in alliance with
many other governments.
• Cocaine should be “de-demonised” because
as long as cocaine continues to be forbid-
den, it will be argued that commercial coca,
including ground leaves in filter bags,will be
used to manufacture cocaine. An open
debate on costs and benefits of this prohi-
bition can no longer be avoided.
• The  “harm-reduction” focus is an important
contribution offering an alternative strate-
gy to ‘drug control” through military and
police repression, which has demonstrated
its incapacity and counter productivity in
controlling the trade in controlled sub-
stances. However, it corresponds to the
consumer countries situation, and has little
to offer for innocuous coca consumption in
Bolivia.
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24 Spedding, Llanos, Angola, Aguilar, Huanca and Gonzáles (in press) present a detailed analysis of coca production and the quantita-
tive data available on the subject.
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Legend 
Traditional production area’s 
(Law 1008,Art.9)
Provinces:
1. Nor y Sud Yungas (LaPaz)
2. Murillo (LP)
3. Muñecas (LP)
4. Fransz Tamayo (LP)
5. Inquisivi (LP)
6. Yungas de Vadiola (Cochbamba) 
Excedentary and transition production area’s
(Law 1008.Art.10)
Provinces;
A. Saavedra (LP)
B. Larecaja (LP)
C. Loayza (LP)
D. Áreas de colonización de Yungas (LP)2
E. Chapare (Cbba)
F. Carrasco (Cbba)
G. Tiraque (Cbba)
H. Arani (Cbba)
6 F
E
G
H
A
B
C
1
5
2
4
3
1 There is no good map of coca leaf production in Bolivia.This map reflects the legal framework, Law 1.800, promulgated on July 20
1988, in which traditional and excedentary transition area’s are distinguised, these last being subject to initial compensation and alter-
native crop substitution.
2 Not indicated on the map.
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LA PAZ
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Legend
Areas of coca cultivation for ilicit purposes
1. R: B. Marañon (Utcubamba Chachapoyas)
2. R: Bajo Huallaga (Tarapoto)
3. A: Huallaga C.-Uchiza-Ongon (Juanjui)
4. A: A. Huallaga-Monzon (Tingo Maria)
5. R: Aguaytia-Alto Ucayali (Aguaytia)
6. R: Pachitea (Pto Inca)
7. R: Pichis- Palcazu (Pto. Bermudez) 
8. R: Perene- Tambo- Bajo Ene (Satipo) 
9. A: Apurimac- Alto Ene (S. Francisco) 
10. R: Alto Amazonas (Nauta)
11. R: Bajo Ucayali (Pucallpa) 
12. R: Putumayo (El Estercho- Leticia) 
13. R:Yavari (Caballococha- Tabatinga)
14. R: Alto Purus (Esperanza- Rio Branco)
15. R: Madre de Dios (P. Maldonado- P. Heath)
A.T: Urubamba- Yanatile (Quillabamba)
B.T: Inambari- Tambopata (Sandia)
C.T: Alto Marañon (Humachuco)
D.T: Chicama- Moche (Simbal- Otuzco) (*) 
R: Recent cultivation areas
A: Old cultivation areas
T:Traditional cultivation areas * 
he ineffective policy of forced coca
erradication2 in neighbouring Peru,
has also led to the mobilisation of
coca growers and eventually to the
creation late 2000, of a Dialogue
Group to negotiate with the government. For
several reasons, mainly U.S pressure, the
government is unable to properly channel
the domestic and grassroots proposals made
by a small but significant sector of society into
an alternative policy.
The Dialogue Group met during the first six
months of 2001, but the transitional govern-
ment ignored the farmers’ proposals.This let
to more mobilisations in 2001-2002, culmi-
nating in the signing of several agreements
with the new government of President Tole-
do.3The Toledo administration ignored these
commitments, and in January 2003, farmers
from the Upper Huallaga, Aguaytía,Tocache,
Uchiza, Puerto Pizana and the Apurímac-Ene
founded the National Federation of Peasant
Producers of the Peruvian Coca-Producing
Basins (Confederación Nacional de Produc-
tores Agropecuarios de las Cuencas
Cocaleras del Perú, CONPACCP) in Lima. A
month later, in response to forced coca erad-
ication among legal producers in Aguaytía,
several thousand farmers staged a strike.The
government responded by repressing the
strike and jailing Nelson Palomino, the leader
of CONPACCP.The farmers then set out on
a March of Sacrifice to Lima in April 2003.
The march concluded with new proposals
partially outlined in a Supreme Decree issued
by the government, although it did not meet
the coca growers’ expectations. Further-
more, the national drug agency, the National
Commission for Development and Life with-
out Drugs (Comisión Nacional para el Desar-
rollo y Vida sin Drogas DEVIDA), the govern-
ment, and NGOs that carry out projects, such
as Chemonics, have distorted the Supreme
Decree’s conciliatory spirit, attempting to
divide CONPACCP and undermining its’
leaders willingness to dialogue by using a
series of manoeuvres, including the bribing of
journalists involved in ‘awareness-raising’
campaigns.
Cocaleros 
Cocaleros are farmers who produce coca in
the high jungle areas on the eastern slope of
the Andes Mountains. The coca plots are
small, between 0.25 and 1.5 hectares.There
are producer associations in 13 coca-produc-
ing basins, and traditional peasant unions
mainly in the province of La Convencion in
Cusco. Peru has about 50,000 coca growers,
who also consume coca in the traditional
manner. There are approximately 2 million
more traditional coca consumers.
A serious flaw in alternative development
projects has been their tendency to consid-
er the high jungle an empty space where a
social fabric barely exists or where it was
destroyed by the violence of the 1980s.This
is a misconception; there is, in fact, a firm
social structure reflected in a multitude of
community organisations, unions, producer
associations and cultural groups.
The Peruvian cocalero movement is organised
on three levels: international, national and in
the local river basins.At the international level,
in 1991 the Andean Council of Coca Leaf Pro-
ducers (Consejo Andino de Productores de
Hoja de Coca CAPHC) was founded in La Paz,
but it became inactive in 1998. Evo Morales
of Bolivia has been its leader since 1995.
CAPHC has held three international meet-
ings, in La Paz (March 1991), Cusco (May
1993) and Quillabamba (October 1995), has
appeared four times before the UN Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna
(1993-1997), and has held various training
workshops and meetings. The last one took
place in Puno in May 1998. In international
fora, CAPHC has stated the following aims:
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1 Economist from the Pacific University, President of the Civil Association for Sustainable Integral Rural Develop-
ment (Asociación Civil Desarrollo Rural Integral Sustentable, DRIS), Director Secretary of the Peruvian Foreign Rela-
tions Forum (FOPRI) and adviser to several farmer organisations in the Peruvian river basins were coca is grown.
2 Hugo Cabieses critiques this strategy in “Erradicación de la coca: política boba,” Lima, June 16, 1999.
3 See Rojas, I., Lanzando la aventura de la ‘coca cero’: transición democrática y política antidrogas en el Perú;
WOLA, February 2003.
• To reject illicit drug traffic, but also the ‘war
on drugs’ and militarisation, because they
are ineffective.
• To eliminate the US  ‘certification’ system,
which violates national sovereignty, under-
mines democracy and fails to take into
account civil society’s opinions and pro-
posals.
• To change ideas about drugs so that peo-
ple distinguish between coca and cocaine,
coca leaf producers and drug traffickers,
and consumers of coca and drug addicts.
• To promote the removal of the coca leaf
from Schedule 1 of the UN Controlled
Substances Scheme, reaffirming the leaf ’s
beneficial traditional and industrial uses.
• To seek substantial changes in neoliberal
policies and international trade relations.
• To foster community participation in the
drafting of development programmes.
On a national scale, after several previous
attempts, the National Coordinating Com-
mittee of Agricultural Producers (Coordi-
nación Nacional de Productores Agrícolas
CONAPA- Peru), consisting of eight federa-
tions and associations,was created in Lima in
February 1998 to serve growers in the
cocalero basins. An indigenous organisation
(OARA: Asháninkas del Río Apurímac) and
four associations of peasant women (Apurí-
mac-Ene, Tingo María, Uchiza and Monzón)
also joined.CONAPA-Peru held three nation-
al meetings, but did not extend its proposals
to the rest of the national peasant movement.
When the government established the Dia-
logue Group in 2000, CONAPA languished
until it virtually disappeared.During the 2002
strikes and marches, the cocaleros came
together and gained strength, founding the
National Confederation of Agricultural Pro-
ducers of the Peruvian Cocalero Basins (Con-
federación Nacional de Productores
Agropecuarios de las Cuencas Cocaleras del
Perú CONPACCP) on January 20, 2003.
The Dialogue Group 
The Fujimori-Montesinos government (1990-
2000) promoted forced coca eradication
beginning in March 1996. This caused social
unrest, kindled subversive violence and
sparked the rise of organised social move-
ments in the cocalero regions. These actions
led to the creation of a Dialogue Group to
debate and draft proposals focusing on four
main issues: temporary suspension of forced
eradication of coca crops and its replacement
with a gradual, consensus-driven strategy
agreed to by farmers and local authorities;
debate and approval of a new law on drugs
and coca to replace the current obsolete and
inefficient legislation that criminalises cultur-
ally appropriate and beneficial uses of coca
leaf; research on the use of national and
international ‘alternative development’ funds
and real participation by producer organisa-
tions in the design of a new strategy; and an
increase in the price paid to producers for
coca leaves and improvement of services
provided by the National Coca Company
(Empresa Nacional de la Coca ENACO),
including the participation of farmer repre-
sentatives on its Board of Directors and a
national and international strategy to foster
acceptance of coca.
Between November 2000 and February 2003,
local farmers and authorities from the cocalero
regions participating in the Dialogue Group
insisted repeatedly and in various ways that
those four points be discussed with the com-
petent government authorities: Contradrogas
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Composition of the CONPACCP
Valley Nr of members 
Apurímac-Ene 11000
Alto Huallaga-Uchiza 2000
Alto Huallaga-Pto. Pizana 1500
Alto Huallaga-Aucayacu 3000
Alto Huallaga-Tingo María 3000
Aguaytía 1200
Pichis-Palcazu 1000
Monzón 2500
Jaén San Ignacio 260
TOTAL 25460
Source: Hugo Cabieses
until May 2002 and DEVIDA thereafter, the
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Agri-
culture and ENACO. First Contradrogas and
later DEVIDA attempted to include on their
main agendas the issues that local farmers and
authorities proposed, but they did not sup-
port the proposals strongly enough and ten-
sions increased in the cocalero basins.
The Dialogue Group,which has the potential
to ease social and political tension and fos-
ter debate of technical issues, has not func-
tioned as regularly as required by law. Its last
formal meeting was held in Lima on October
5, 2001. In March 2002, an information work-
shop was held in Lima, but only representa-
tives of the farmers, not the mayors, attend-
ed it.
Agreements 
As a result of the cocalero mobilisations in
2001-2002, government officials signed five
agreements with cocalero leaders.The agree-
ment signed in Lima on July 13, 2002, went
furthest toward the drafting of a political and
technical proposal to launch a new strategy
on sustainable development and illicit coca
crops.The proposal suggested a strategy for
the gradual manual reduction of coca crops
by the farmers themselves, based on consen-
sus with the members of the associations and
federations that signed the agreement. The
strategy, initially applied in a pilot project in
Aguaytía, was to be accompanied by a tech-
nical proposal hinging on the following four
conditions:
• Prior registration of member farmers will-
ing to reduce their crops and immediate
payment of 336 soles (USD 97.40) per
hectare of coca eliminated as soon as
DEVIDA, CADA and a representative of
the pertinent association certified the
reduction;
• Preferential treatment for farmers engag-
ing in reforestation, with immediate pay-
ment of 1,686 soles (USD 489) per refor-
ested hectare;
• Emergency credit of approximately 2,100
soles (USD 609) per hectare for crops that
the farmers choose freely and that are
aimed at safe secondary and short-term
markets (bean, rice, cassava and plantain
flour) and insurance through Agrobanco;
• Priority certificates for benefits derived
from Integral Development Programmes
such as Alternativa.
To promote the proposal, DEVIDA request-
ed the cooperation of the U.S. government
through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), but USAID refused to
honour the agreement with the Association
of Livestock and Coca Leaf Farmers of the
Padre Abad Province (Asociación de Agricul-
tores Agropecuarios y de la Hoja de Coca de
la Provincia de Padre Abad AAAHCPA),
which had signed the agreement.4 Only the
technical proposal, with three substantially
modified points, was accepted.The decision
was made to provide:
• 551 soles (USD 159.70) per hectare erad-
icated, to be paid to individual communi-
ties and producers, ignoring the agree-
ments with producer associations that had
signed the July 13 agreement;
• 650 soles (USD 188.50) food allowance for
each family willing to eradicate its coca
crops;
• Payment for construction work and/or
improvement of the community’s social
and productive infrastructure, for a peri-
od of up to six months; and 
• Preference for farmers as beneficiaries of
medium- and long-range programmes for
producing palm oil, palm hearts, pineapple,
livestock, reforestation, etc.
Their top leader summed up AAAHCPA’s
response to this programme: “We are not
paupers who need donations of food and
small social works.We are farmers who need
credit and markets for new products.”5
With these four components financed by
USAID and monitored by the Narcotics
Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy the pilot
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4 USAID argued that the U.S. government could not fund agreements with ‘narcococaleros.’
5 Statement by Flavio Sánchez Moreno, president of AAAHCPA, Radioprogramas del Perú, 20/08/2003
programme of voluntary eradication was pro-
moted between October and December
2003 in the Von Humboldt Forest in the
Padre Abad Province. Agreements were
reached with 56 communities to eliminate
more than 1,200 hectares of coca; the pro-
ject benefited about 600 farmers. The pilot
project’s main political problem was that the
association, which had signed the July 13
2002 agreement, refused to participate. It
also suffered from technical problems,
because the two main points of the propos-
al on which agreement had been reached —
a credit programme for short-term activities
and payment for reforestation — never got
off the ground.
The Founding of CONPACCP 
Because of the problems in Aguaytía, exacer-
bated by DEVIDA’s failure to honour the
agreements reached with the farmers from
Tingo María,Aucayacu, Puerto Pizana,Uchiza
and Apurímac- Ene, those farmers decided to
travel to Lima and present their demands and
proposals to the government and Congress.
In the pact signed in Lima on July 13, leaders
from the Upper Huallaga and Aguaytía lead-
ers had agreed to the creation of technical
commissions of farmers and government staff
members. This did not work out, however,
because in some cases DEVIDA did not even
establish the commissions.
In Apurímac-Ene, DEVIDA failed to comply
with agreements signed with several leaders
in Ayacucho on August 4, 2002, after a strike
and protests. It also ignored another agree-
ment signed in November 2002 after threats
of rural strikes and a boycott of municipal and
regional elections. In that case, the key issues
were the withdrawal of the NGO CARE
from the zone, the debate and approval of a
new coca law, and the registration of farm-
ers by ENACO.
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Dialogues and Agreements
Year Type of Dialogue/ Origin Agreement /Disagreements Dates - dura-
tion
2000
2001
There has been constant ten-
sion around forced eradication
in the cocalero basins since
1996. 
Creation of Dialogue Table to discuss four main issues:
suspension of forced eradication; new legislation; alter-
native development research; better prices/ participation
in ENACO and common strategy.
They reach no agreements. 
November 2000
to October 2001
2002 Mobilisations and failure of
Dialogue Tables; Meeting.
Five Acts signed between different leaders and the gov-
ernment, one of these agreeing to create technical com-
missions. DEVIDA does not comply with these.
July 13
Threat of agrarian strike. Acts signed with Apurimac-Ene leaders; DAVIDA does
not comply with them.
Between August
and November
Meetig with DEVIDA to create
technical commission.
Commission never worked. Instead CONPACCP was
founded in the presence of 35 leaders.
September 11
2003 National meeting in Lima. Elected directives present 24-point plea to Peru’s Presi-
dent; they sign Commmitment Act.
January 20 and 21 
Forced eradication in Alto
Huallaga convokes marches
and protests. 
Mediating commission named; offers 72 hour-truce to
government; meeting with government follows. They
agree to create Technical Commission (CTAN).
February-
March
Sacrifice March of CONPACCP.
Meeting with President Toledo.
Delegation of 32 leaders signs Supreme Decree with
agreements adopted jointly with the President; issued
with changes in content on April 24.
April
2004 Compromiso de concertar
nueva estrategia droga 2004-
2008 y declaración de emergen-
cia de cocaleros del Chapare.
Delegación de 32 dirigentes firma un Decreto Supremo
con acuerdos adoptados con el Presidente, promulgado
con otro contenido el día 24 de Abril.
Strat February 16
Source: Hugo Cabieses
On September 11, 2002, in the same DEVIDA
office where members of a special commis-
sion had been called to draft a proposal for
the new coca law — which never occurred —
35 leaders from Apurímac-Ene, the Upper
Huallaga and Aguaytía decided to create their
own confederation.They appointed a Transi-
tional Board to call a national meeting, which
was held in Lima on January 20-21, 2003,with
1,210 delegates from different basins.
The delegates paid their own way to Lima,
elected a board of 13 members and submit-
ted a 24-point platform to President Toledo
and other authorities. They also signed a
statement that called for a national strike and
a March of Sacrifice if forced eradication was
resumed anywhere in the country. DEVIDA,
ENACO and the Interior Ministry, however,
did not take the Confederation or the lead-
ers’ statement seriously.
The strikes of February 2003 
In February 2003, the Upper Huallaga Special
Project for the Control of Coca Crop Erad-
ication and Reduction (Proyecto Especial de
Control y Reducción de Cultivos de Coca en
el Alto Huallaga CORAH), forcibly eradicat-
ed coca in the town of Alto Shambillo
(Aguaytía). Two AAAHCPA members were
wounded. The town’s lieutenant governor
was jailed when he interceded on the farm-
ers’ behalf.The farmers had official receipts
from ENACO for the legal delivery of coca,
plus their association membership cards. It
was CORAH’s failure to recognise these that
caused the clash.
This action, which CORAH later admitted
was a mistake,6 sparked an immediate reac-
tion from the farmers. In coordination with
CONPACCP, they held several marches
between February 20 and 28, as well as strikes
and roadblocks in Aguaytía, Monzón, Tingo
María Aucayacu and Puerto Pizana. On Feb-
ruary 28, at a General Assembly in Tingo
María, they decided to grant the government
a 72-hour truce to negotiate a solution. A
negotiating commission made up of local
authorities, without any leader of the farm-
ers’ movement, was appointed.
While that was happening in the Upper Hual-
laga, on 21 February 2003, the top leader of
the Apurímac-Ene farmers and president of
CONPACCP, Nelson Palomino, who was in
Huamanga coordinating a mobilisation in that
valley, was arrested in the regional office of
the government’s Human Rights Ombudsman
and jailed in the Yanamilla Prison. He was
accused of ‘justification of terrorism’ and
another six unproven counts, and his case was
sent to the court in Huamanga.Days later, the
Interior Ministry announced that the charge
of ‘justification of terrorism’ was a mistake
and that the executive branch had no control
over the case. Nevertheless, both the Interi-
or Minister and the director of DEVIDA,
Nils Ericsson told the press that drug traffick-
ers, terrorists and politicians were manipulating
cocalero leaders.
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6 Personal conversation with the director of DEVIDA, Nils Ericsson (29.4.2003)
General secretary:
Nelson Palomino Laserna 
Sub-General secretary:
Nancy Obregón Peralta 
S. of Organisation:
Elsa Malpartida Jara 
S. of Minutes and Archives:
Azucena Veramendi Silva 
S. of Defense: Juan Ríos Esquivel 
S. of Discipline: Teodoro Pino Suárez 
S. of Economy:
Flavio Sánchez Moreno 
S. of Mobilisation:
Guillermo Mendoza Cortavarría 
S. of Press and Publicity:
Necidio Camargo Mantari 
S. of International affaires:
Richard Quispe Chuco 
S. of Gender:
Diodora Espinoza Vara 
S. of Culture and Sports:
William Cervenates Celis 
National Coördinator of ???????:
Antonio Gabancho Mosquera 
Board of dirctors of the  CONPACCP 
2004-2005
On March 5, the negotiating commission,
which did not include leaders from the farmer
associations that had called the strike, along
with several local mayors and the president
of the Regional Government of Huanuco,met
with the Prime Minister, DEVIDA’s Executive
President and the Secretary General of the
National Decentralisation Council (Consejo
Nacional de Descentralización CND). It was
agreed that a High-Level Technical Commis-
sion (Comisión Técnica de Alto Nivel CTAN)
would be appointed to travel to the cocalero
basins where the conflict had occurred, iden-
tify the problems and propose solutions.With-
out understanding that the problem was polit-
ical rather than technical, the members of the
commission visited Monzón and Cachicoto,
Aguaytía and Tocache-Uchiza-Puerto Pizana. It
was the first time most of them had been in
the region, and they did
not know that, as far
back as 1997 farmers
had carried out various
participatory rural analy-
ses, identifying the main
problems and present-
ing specific proposals for
programmes and pro-
jects to Contradrogas and
various international
cooperation agencies.
The April 2003 Marches 
The government launched a new propagan-
da campaign against the CONPACCP leader-
ship. It attempted to divide the organisation
by supporting leaders who were not cocaleros
and began talking with farmers who were
beneficiaries of ‘alternative development’ pro-
grammes and local mayors, meeting with
them in Lima on April 1 and 8.While CON-
PACCP leaders were setting out on their
March of Sacrifice, the president of DEVIDA
went to Vienna,where he addressed the 46th
Session of the U.N. Commission on Narcot-
ic Drugs on April 8. He was out of the coun-
try until April 20.
On Sunday, April 20, as the marchers
approached Lima,DEVIDA issued a statement
in which it emphasised “talks under way with
coca producers and [its] commitment to develop-
ment” and noted that the technical commis-
sions had met with cocalero leaders between
April 7 and 15. According to the statement,
the participants in those meetings had agreed
to:
• the gradual and consensus-guided reduc-
tion of illegal coca plantations;
• arranging with the Interior Ministry for
CORAH to intervene only in the elimina-
tion of maceration pits and new coca plan-
tations, while farmers and CADA carried
out a gradual and consensus-guided erad-
ication;
• carrying out a study to determine the real
demand for legal coca consumption, in
order to calculate the
area needed to produce
that crop;
• updating the data
base to include farmers
currently selling their
crops to ENACO;
• 5) compiling the rec-
ommendations made by
multi-sector teams
working in the various
basins to link chains of
production.
DEVIDA’s statement undermined the CON-
PACCP leaders, claiming that “a minority group
is insisting on misinforming about the dialogue
process, imposing strikes and marches that hinder
the actions of the working groups.”
Two contingents of coca growers participat-
ed in the March of Sacrifice. One consisted
of more than 4,000 men,women and children
from San Francisco and Quimbiri, and the
other was made up of about 2,000 people
from Uchiza, Puerto Pizana, Sión, Aucayacu,
Tingo María and Aguaytía. They marched
peacefully, without blocking highways or dis-
turbing the peace.7 Displaying placards, slo-
gans and visible signs of poverty, the marchers
set up blankets and communal cooking pots
in front of the Palace of Justice, right next to
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7 On April 10, there were clashes with the police in Huamanga because of a roadblock by youths who were not mem-
bers of FEPA-VRAE, during which arrests were made and some people were wounded.
Without understanding that
the problem was political
rather than technical, the
commission visited Monzón
and Cachicoto, Aguaytía
and Tocache-Uchiza-Puerto
Pizana
the Lima Sheraton Hotel.Their leaders sought
meetings with the media,Congress, the prime
minister and the president.
Meeting with the President and the
Supreme Decree 
After long discussions with the cocalero lead-
ers in the prime minister’s office and DEVI-
DA, on April 23, 2003, President Toledo
received a delegation of 32 leaders, signed the
Supreme Decree reflecting the agreements
that had been reached, and visited the
marchers, where he stated that:
• coca producers are
not drug traffickers;
• the Supreme Decree
could be improved
and his office door
was open for that; and 
• ENACO would
reopen its registry to
include the farmers
who belonged to the
associations repre-
sented by the Con-
federation.
According to the cocalero leaders, the Decree,
which was signed into law on April 24, was
not freely accepted by them, but had been
imposed by DEVIDA and the office of the
prime minister. In fact, the decree echoed a
statement issued by DEVIDA on Sunday,April
20, and did not reflect the farmers’ main
proposals, which included dropping the trial
of the union leaders and releasing Nelson
Palomino. The decree made DEVIDA,
CORAH, CADA, ENACO and the Agricul-
ture Ministry responsible for implementing its
five points, and changed nothing.
In response, on April 26 the cocalero leaders
sent a letter to the president saying they had
been deceived.They presented an alternative
proposal with a 30-day deadline for further
discussion. “We do not agree to putting DEVIDA,
ENACO, CORAH and the Agriculture Ministry in
charge of carrying out the actions approved in the
Supreme Decree.We have mobilised,among other
reasons, because they are inefficient, attempt to
manipulate us,have not honoured past agreements
and have lost credibility with us,” the leaders said.
The cocalero leaders believe that the govern-
ment was pressured by the United States, but
trusted that President Toledo would address
their demands “because he was poor once, he
was elected president thanks to us, and during his
campaign he said he would not forcibly eradicate
coca.” They requested new talks with him
within 30 days, saying they would resume
protests if their request was not granted.The
deadline was May 26; another meeting was
held that day in Lima, at which they agreed
to extend the deadline.
Despite all this, the coca
growers have made
some significant
progress: formal recog-
nition of CONPACCP
as their representative;
issuing of the Supreme
Decree; real, though not
official, suspension of
forced eradication;
reduction instead of
consensus-based grad-
ual eradication of coca; neutralisation of the
media campaign that had called tem ‘drug traf-
fickers and terrorists’ and said they were
being manipulated; and a meeting with Pres-
ident Toledo.The leaders, however, have NOT
signed any agreement. And the basic political
problems remain unsolved:
• guaranteeing compliance with the agree-
ments signed in 2002;
• dropping the court cases against cocalero
leaders and releasing Nelson Palomino,
who was jailed in February;
• temporary, unofficial suspension of forced
eradication and its replacement with a
strategy of consensus-based gradual,man-
ual reduction as outlined in the July 2002
agreement;
• participation in the drafting of a new coca
law, following an independent study of
legal coca use and, above all, registration
of new producers in ENACO, rather than
simply updating information about those
who were registered in 1978.
The farmers presented an 11-point platform.
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“Because he was poor
once, he was elected
president thanks to us,
and during his campaign
he said he would not
forcibly eradicate coca.”
Their demands could be resolved, and there
are sufficient resources for that, but the gov-
ernment is not independent enough from the
United States. As in the case of transporta-
tion workers, teachers and farmers from
other regions, before analysing how problems
might be solved, the government has attempt-
ed to: 1) isolate the Confederation from the
other farmers, negotiating with each basin
separately on the grounds that this is being
done for “technical reasons;” and 2) under-
mine the legitimacy of the farmers’ propos-
als, claiming that they are being manipulated
by terrorists, drug traffickers and politicians.
There are differences in approaches and great
contradictions between cocaleros in Upper
Huallaga and Apurímac-Ene, as well as those
in Monzón and Quillabamba, but the govern-
ment should encourage dialogue, support
the empowerment of these organisations
and understand that these farmers want to
be formal, law-abiding citizens, that they set
their hopes on President Toledo, voting for
him, and are tired of bureaucrats and NGOs
that do not take them seriously and that are
trying to impose policies with which the
farmers do not agree.
Current situation in the coca-
producing valleys 
The situation in the coca-producing valleys is
currently tense again, as the 60-day deadline
to which CONPACCP agreed in Lima to
launch a five-point Immediate Plan for Strug-
gle, has recently passed. The waiting period
could have been shortened if the government
had resumed its voluntary eradication pro-
gramme, since the pattern so far has been
‘accept or we eradicate your crops anyway,’
or if forced eradication had continued in
specific parts of certain coca-producing val-
leys, as is currently occurring in Masisea and
Nueva Requena,Ucayali, the province of Hual-
laga, and Saposoa in San Martín. Local may-
ors have spoken out against the presence of
DEVIDA and CORAH. The 60-day deadline
could have also be shortened if DEVIDA or
the NGOs involved — against which there
are court cases pending because of their
inefficiency, disrespect and deceit — contin-
ued to flaunt their financial resources and
capacity for publicity, reflected in their fleet
of pick-up trucks and motorcycles, in their
pursuit of the goals of the U.S. government
and USAID.
A significant number of the grievances and
complaints by farmers and local authorities
against DEVIDA and the NGOs and other
agencies carrying out ‘alternative develop-
ment’ and ‘voluntary eradication’ plans have
been corroborated by oral testimony, writ-
ten complaints from beneficiaries and pho-
tographs. The agreements reached in Lima
(CONPACCP) and Cusco (FEPCACYL) are
extremely radical in comparison to the pro-
posals made by farmers between 2001 and
2003.This resulted from the deaf ear turned
by DEVIDA and the implementing NGOs
and their disregard for the balanced, feasible
proposals signed by the cocalero leaders in 14
agreements, as well as the Supreme Decree
issued by President Toledo in April 2003. In
Cusco, the proposals have been summed up
in the slogan, “Coca or death... we shall over-
come.”
As a result, contrary to DEVIDA’s statements
and local media reports, the cocalero move-
ment, goaded by DEVIDA and the Interior
Ministry’s constant demonising, is currently
working on three levels, although this is still
incipient and somewhat chaotic. There is
national coordination among the cocaleros,
national coordination with other sectors,
and coordination at the international level.
On the national level, bonds have been
strengthened among cocaleros in the various
basins. They have different characteristics,
but similar demands.CONPACCP was found-
ed in January 2003, basically with leaders
from Apurímac/Ene, the Upper Huallaga and
Aguaytía, which together represented half of
the 50,000 coca growers estimated to exist
in the country, almost none of whom is reg-
istered with ENACO. CONPACCP has since
expanded to include leaders and members
from the other half of the coca-growing pop-
ulation, including more than 15,000 who are
registered with ENACO,although a significant
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group of Apurímac/Ene leaders have with-
drawn from CONPACCP.
Meanwhile, the cocalero movement has begun
to approach political parties, not only the
‘Ollanta’ movement of the Humala brothers,
but Perú Ahora, APRA, Patria Roja and other
left-wing parties. It has also established links
with non-coca-growing organisations that
have pledged support for its proposals, such
as SUTEP, the CGTP, the Departmental Fed-
eration of Peasants of Cusco (Federación
Departamental de Campesinos del Cusco)
(as coca consumers), the Federation of
Indigenous Ayllus of Ayacucho (Federación
de Ayllus Indígenas de Ayacucho), the
Chota/Cajamarca Association of Livestock
and Coca Farmers (Asociación de Agricul-
tores y Ganaderos de Coca de Chota/Caja-
marca), the National Peasant Self-Defence
Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora
Nacional de Rondas Campesinas), the Asso-
ciation of Agrarian Producers of Lima (Aso-
ciación de Productores Agrarios de Lima), the
Aymara, Amazon and Quechua Grassroots
Organisation (Organización de Bases
Aymaras, Amazónicas y Quechuas), the
Departmental Federation of Peasant Commu-
nities of Huancavelica (Federación Departa-
mental de Comunidades Campesinas de
Huancavelica), etc.
At the international level, the leaders have
agreed to re-establish and strengthen the
Andean Council of Coca Leaf Producers
(Consejo Andino de Productores de Hoja de
Coca CAPHC), led by Evo Morales,which has
not met since June 1998. The leaders have
contacted Morales and agreed to meet in
Puno.They have also established or renewed
ties with political parties and other organi-
sations in Bolivia (basically MAS and the Fed-
erations of Chapare and the Yungas), Ecuador
(Pachacutik) and the United States (WOLA
and the Drug Reform Network), and
approached TNI in The Netherlands, ENCOD
in Belgium and MLAL in Italy. Relations with
Colombia are very incipient, but contact has
been renewed with the Colombian union
leader Omayra Morales, CAPHC’s Commu-
nication and Promotion Secretary.
In contrast to statements made by the Inte-
rior and Defence Ministries, certain analysts
and the media, the security situation in the
valleys — especially the Apurímac/Ene and
Monzón — has been unchanged in recent
months. There is no sign of Sendero Lumi-
noso regrouping to carry out significant
armed actions that would threaten security
in the valleys. Rather, all signs point toward
peaceful political action. Local residents and
farmers reject violence and favour peaceful
protest, such as the March of Sacrifice, with-
out blocking roads, smashing windows, throw-
ing stones, taking hostages, etc.They learned
the lessons taught by the Sacrifice March in
2003, and the fact that women are leading this
movement gives it a particular overtone of
peaceful defence — although with radical
language — in search of respect and the
affirmation of civil rights.
With respect to illicit drug trafficking, there
is a large scattering of bands and dealers who
buy coca leafs or washed paste, but there are
no reports of violence or revenge killings.The
gangs have no visible leaders or strategic
plan, but appear to be isolated groups with
little connection or competition among
themselves.Thus DINANDRO can boast to
the media about ‘successful’ operations in
which petty criminals are nabbed and large
amounts of drugs confiscated, while the big
drug barons escape. So far, interdiction tar-
geting maceration pits and drugs, such as
Operation Fierro 2003, carried out in
Monzón and the Apurímac/Ene in November
and December 2003, have proven counter-
productive, because they do not involve
sound socio-economic development plans
with citizen participation or the establish-
ment of permanent police stations. Further-
more, these actions have no relation to the
real drug traffickers, although they do tem-
porarily lower coca prices, and only serve to
justify U.S. funding of other Interior Ministry
activities.
Main complaints of Local Farmers
and Authorities 
Contradrogas and DEVIDA have not honoured
the agreements signed between 2001 and
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2003 and have ignored proposals made by the
cocalero leaders in the Dialogue Group.
No studies of soil, plant disease or fungi have
been done, nor have there been economic
and ecological studies that could serve as the
basis for productive projects.There has been
no serious study to determine demand for
legal uses of coca. Farmers have not been
allowed to register with ENACO, although
this demand was included in the agreements
that were signed. No census has been done
to determine coca production ratios and
yield.
Specific complaints have been lodged against
ENACO because of problems related to
prices, quality ratings, weights and abuses
committed when the
agency purchases coca
leaves from producers.
Signing agreements has
not solved these prob-
lems. The voluntary
eradication of coca
crops upheld by the
April 2003 Supreme
Decree is ineffective, as
it was not established
with the farmers belong-
ing to the associations
and federations whose
leaders led the March of Sacrifice.The argu-
ment used is that the United States does not
recognise these organisations as valid partic-
ipants in actions involving USAID.Voluntary
eradication is done with “communities” and
individuals, but excludes legitimate producer
organisations, such as the associations and
federations, from all decisions about the
process.Voluntary eradication is a pre-requi-
site for being considered a beneficiary of the
alternative development programmes,
summed up in the phrase, “eradicate first,
then we deliver the benefits”.
After voluntary eradication, DEVIDA and its
implementing agencies, such as Chemonics
and other NGOs,have not kept their promis-
es. While families were promised USD 180
each, to be paid after eradication, many have
received only 160 soles.The rest has not been
paid,or if it has, an excessive amount has been
deducted for the tools they received to erad-
icate the coca. Regarding the food aid of
USD 150 per family from CORAH, the
rations have often been incomplete or the
food has not been delivered, even though it
was included in the agreement.Technical sup-
port and tools, seeds and seedlings for the
productive projects are often of a sort that
are not priorities for local farmers. For exam-
ple, the proposal for palm oil and cotton in
Neshuya-Curimaná was not supported, but
was replaced by plantains and corn, although
there was not a sure market for these prod-
ucts. In the case of the two social and/or eco-
nomic infrastructure projects decided on by
the community, DEVIDA or its contractors
carry out one but not the other, and in sev-
eral cases the works
have been overvalued.
Meanwhile, DEVIDA
and/or Chemonics pre-
sent as their own suc-
cessful productive activ-
ities that have actually
been carried out by the
private sector or other
institutions. Examples
include palm oil produc-
tion in Neshuya, which
is a joint effort by grow-
ers and the UNDCP with partial funding
from the Peru-Canadian Trust Fund, cotton in
San Alejandro, and plantain and pineapple
production in Aguaytía, which is an individual
effort by farmers. Some people who are list-
ed as cocaleros benefiting from the programs
are actually merchants, teachers, motorcycle
taxi drivers, etc., who have allowed their
names to be used. Furthermore, in many
cases the number of registered beneficiaries
in a community or village is greater than the
total number of inhabitants.
DEVIDA may have appropriated some of the
ideas of the farmers’ associations about pro-
ductive projects. For example, leaders in
Aguaytía had presented a USD 19 million pro-
gramme focusing on five productive areas —
palm oil, livestock development, cotton, refor-
estation and a processing plant for cassava
Contradrogas and DEVIDA
have not honoured the
agreements signed between
2001 and 2003 and have
ignored proposals made by
the cocalero leaders in the
Dialogue Group
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USED ABREVIATIONS
AAAHCPA Asociación de Agricultores Agropecuarios y de la Hoja de Coca de la Provincia de Padre Abad
CADA Cuerpo de Apoyo al Desarrollo Alternativo
CAPHC  Consejo Andino de Productores de Hoja de Coca
CGTP Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú
CTAN Comisión Técnica de Alto Nivel
CONPACCP Confederación Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios de las Cuencas Cocaleras del Perú
CONAPA Coordinadora Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios
CORAH Proyecto Especial de Control y Reducción de Cultivos de Coca en el Alto Huallaga
DEVIDA Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas
ENACO Empresa Nacional de Comercialización de la Coca
MAS Movimiento al Socialismo
NAS Oficina de Asuntos Narcóticos
PCM Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros 
PNUFID Programa de Naciones Unidas para la Fiscalización Internacional de Drogas
SUTEP Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú
OARA Asháninkas del Río Apurímac
USAID Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional
VRAE Valle del Rio Apurimac y Ene   
plant. The proposal was shelved, but now
DEVIDA is promoting reforestation without
involving the association. Several leaders and
farmers in the Monzón and Apurímac-Ene
valleys contend that maceration pits that are
being targeted, like those targeted by Oper-
ation Fierro 2003, are old pits that had
already been raided earlier.
The farmers consider TV reports about coca
and drug trafficking to be an insult.This is par-
ticularly true in La Convención, where all of
the coca leaves produced are used for tradi-
tional coca chewing. No significant progress
has been made on the new coca law. Instead,
Congress is discussing more than 10 draft
laws. Meanwhile a new protest cycle has
started causing new tensions of the same
kind.
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Following Bolivia's 2002 parliamentary
elections, the success of the political party
headed by cocalero leader Evo Morales,
rekindled debate regarding cocalero
organisations in the Andes and their
vindications. Disinformation around these
organisations has contributed to a rise in
terms l ike narcoguerr i l leros and
narcoterroristas, etc. being applied to the
various cocalero peasant movements.
At the core of this debate l ies the
relationship between good governance,
drug policies and the cocalero movements.
The unbalanced approach of international
drug control, the lack of leeway that
governments and societies in the South
enjoy to design their own, independent
policies, and the phantoms conjured
around the cocalero organisations, make
good governance a genuine challenge in
the countries pinpointed as coca
producers.
This issue of Drugs and Conflict analyses
cocalero peasant organisations in Peru and
Bolivia and their interaction with
successive governments during the peasant
mobil isations of recent years. The
achievements and fai lures of such
negotiations expose the difficulty in finding
peaceful and sustainable solutions to an
issue as intricate as the cultivation of coca
leaf.
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Founded in 1974,TNI is an inter-
national network of activist-
scholars committed to critical
analyses of the global problems
of today and tomorrow. It aims
to provide intellectual support
to those movements concerned
to steer the world in a democra-
tic, equitable and environmen-
tally sustainable direction.
Since 1996, the TNI Drugs &
Democracy programme has
been analysing trends in the ille-
gal drugs economy and in drug
policies globally, their causes and
their effects on economy, peace
and democracy.
The Drugs & Democracy pro-
gramme conducts field investi-
gations, engages policy debates,
briefs journalists and officials,
coordinates international cam-
paigns and conferences, pro-
duces articles, publications and
briefing documents, and main-
tains a daily electronic news ser-
vice on drugs-related issues.
The aim of the project and of
the Drugs and Conflict series is
to stimulate a re-assessment of
conventional prohibitive and
repressive policy approaches and
to argue for policies based on
principles consistent with a com-
mitment to harm reduction, fair
trade,development,democracy,
human rights, environmental
and health protection, and con-
flict prevention.
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